

Supplemental Appendix For  
**Civil Dissent and Repression: An Agency-Centric Perspective**

**Contents**

<b>Summary statistics and correlation plots</b>	<b>2</b>
Summary statistics . . . . .	2
Correlation plots . . . . .	3
<b>Review of Previous Research</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Sensitivity Analyses</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Coding Riots and Nonviolent Dissent in Pakistan</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>17</b>

This appendix includes four parts. In the first part we report summary statistics for our variables and correlation plots mentioned in the main paper. The second part reports a discussion of past research relevant to our theoretical argument. In the third part we report models that adds two-to-five-month lags of both DVs to the full model, followed by sensitivity analyses using negative binomial models. Finally, we report a list of the sources used to code Figure 2 in the main paper.

## Summary statistics and correlation plots

### *Summary statistics*

Table A1: Summary Statistics of All Variables – January 2007–December 2011

	Minimum	Median	Mean	Max	SD
<i>Formal Repression<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.245	37	1.256
<i>Auxiliary Repression<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.635	175	4.777
<i>Violent Riots<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.028	12	0.356
<i>Nonviolent Dissent<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.674	104	4.609
<i>Civil War Onset<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.020	1	0.139
<i>Coup D'état<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.035	1	0.185
<i>Population<sub>t</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	6.182	9.263	9.071	11.998	1.370
<i>Oil Price<sub>t</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	3.922	4.155	4.202	4.456	0.190
<i>Democracy<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.260	1	0.439
<i>Natural disasters<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.214	1	0.410
<i>Military Repression<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.278	19	1.131
<i>Nighttime Light<sub>t</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	0.242	2.754	2.995	6.993	1.607

<sup>1</sup> Natural log


Table A2: Summary Statistics of All Variables – January 1997–December 2011

	Minimum	Median	Mean	Max	SD
<i>Formal Repression<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.195	37	1.26
<i>Auxiliary Repression<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.569	175	4.401
<i>Violent Riots<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.025	12	0.312
<i>Nonviolent Dissent<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.565	104	3.748
<i>Civil War Onset<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.017	1	0.129
<i>Coup D'état<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.041	1	0.197
<i>Population<sub>t</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	6.026	9.178	8.957	11.998	1.367
<i>Oil Price<sub>t</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	2.682	3.564	4.202	4.456	0.530
<i>Democracy<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.189	1	0.391
<i>Natural disasters<sub>t</sub></i>	0	0	0.195	1	0.396


<sup>1</sup> Natural log

*Correlation plots*

Figure A1: Correlations between the dependent and independent variables



Riots and formal repression



Nonviolent dissent and auxiliary repression

## Review of Previous Research

Scholars found that overt civilian dissent aimed at altering the political status quo is relatively common, especially in states characterized by poor governance and corruption (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). Overt dissent is hence defined as a “confrontational activity... that disrupts and challenges any government actor, agency, or policy” (Carey, 2006, 2), meant to “diminish the perceived legitimacy of authorities through increases disruption within society” (Davenport and Loyle, 2012, 76-77).

Repression scholars often classify anti-regime dissent into two broad categories: nonviolent and violent (Davenport, 1996, 1995; DeMeritt, 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). In their efforts to challenge the state, dissenting citizens can use nonviolent tactics, including marches, ‘sit-ins,’ and strikes, as well as more violent tactics, such as riots, highly-disruptive demonstrations, destruction of property, and even direct attacks against government targets (Tilly, 1978; Davenport, 1995; Carey, 2006). Violent riots, especially when accompanied with the destruction of property and attacks against security forces and other agents of the state, often appear to be a more immediate danger than nonviolent campaigns such as peaceful marches (Davenport, 1995; Carey, 2006). Indeed, the threat of violent mobilization, whether spontaneous or due to deliberate instigation, is perhaps one of the gravest threats to governments (Tilly, 1978; Carey, 2006). Violent dissent also tends to spread rapidly within countries (Tilly, 1978; Davenport, 1995), which implies it can evolve into a credible threat against the government’s rule, and even deteriorate into a civil war, as happened recently, e.g., in Syria and Libya.

Additionally, an extensive body of research focuses on the determinants and consequences of nonviolent dissent, “including symbolic protests, economic boycotts, labor strikes, political and social non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention” (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008, 9-10), which occurs relatively frequently (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Davenport and Loyle, 2012; Gurr, 2000). Debates exist about the net benefits that citizens may obtain from engaging in violent vs. nonviolent dissent (see, e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Davenport,

1995; Hendrix, 2015; Gurr, 2000. Indeed, while governments appear to view nonviolent mobilization as a threat to their rule, it is rarely perceived as serious and immediate a threat as violent dissent is (Davenport, 1995; Moore, 2000). Yet nonviolent resistance can coalesce into large-scale campaigns where the per capita cost of participation is typically low (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Hendrix, 2015). It can also escalate into violent confrontation with the state, especially if met with state-led violence, which can backfire on the government, further weakening its political stance (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). As Tilly notes, “violence ordinarily grows out of collective actions which are not intrinsically violent” (1978, 74), especially if the government employs heavy-handed repression against the nonviolent protests (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Chenoweth, Pinckney and Lewis, 2018).

Often lacking sufficient material capacity to redress citizens’ grievances that trigger discontent, governments rely on repression as an alternative response to both types of dissent (Davenport, 2007). Indeed, relevant studies typically find, as DeMeritt (2016), that “an increase in dissent yields an increase in repression unconditionally,” meaning that if civilians mobilize, the government’s choice of how to repress it is uniform. As leaders often fear domestic dissent can escalate effectively enough to pose an immediate and credible threat to the political status quo, repression is intended to minimize disruptions to the social order, assert political control, and “protect established institutions, practices, and individuals or clear the way for new ones by raising the costs of challenging activity” (Davenport and Loyale, 2012, 77) (Moore, 2000; Carey, 2006; DeMeritt, 2016, see also). Yet, this perspective neglects some important repression determinants, including the role of agency in shaping these behaviors over time. For instance, Pierskalla (2010, 136) argues that, “[i]t would be useful to incorporate notions of loyalty and bureaucratic self-interest to model the implementation of repressive policies. In many instances, repression crucially depends on the willingness of the repressive bureaucracy (e.g., police, military, secret police) to actually follow through on the orders of the government.”

Explaining how governments choose to repress, therefore, requires taking into account the

types of agents available and their specific features. As a result, past research has evaluated the role of auxiliaries – i.e., organizations and groups that are not an integral part of the state’s domestic security apparatus, but which operate under its auspices, or at least with its approval – influence the probability and scope of state violence. Mason and Krane (1989), for instance, argue that a state’s decision to rely on violent, unaccountable agents makes political backlash more likely and increases rebel support.

A more recent wave of research, stimulated in large part by the availability of new data (Carey, Mitchell and Lowe, 2013), looks at the role of pro-government militias – auxiliary armed groups that can represent governments, different ethnic and political communities, or private actors – in facilitating political violence and state repression. Here, scholars primarily emphasize three broad features of such groups that make repressive state violence more likely.

First, auxiliaries are often linked to the regime only loosely, providing the government with “plausible deniability” (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015; Mitchell, Carey and Butler, 2014, e.g.). Second, auxiliaries often have better access to local information compared with state forces, facilitating their ability to operate in specific areas or identify problematic targets (Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, 2015), especially when some militias grow powerful to act as an alternative to the state (Ahram, 2011; Aliyev, 2016). Finally, scholars argue that, often, auxiliaries provide a ‘cheaper’ alternative, in pure material terms, to using formal organizations, thus facilitating political violence (Koren, 2017; Raleigh and Kishi, 2018).

Although political leaders can rely on auxiliary agents to carry out repression, they can deploy agents from the official security apparatus, namely the police, gendarmeries and regulated paramilitary forces (e.g., the Italian Carabinieri, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard in Iran), and even the military. Considering that many official domestic security agents are formed specifically to tackle domestic threats, such agents are arguably most likely to be deployed against dissent. It is therefore both surprising and unsurprising that such domestic organizations received relatively little attention in research on repression and political violence. Surprising, because they serve a central role in carrying on the regime’s orders, and

when and how to follow them; unsurprising because, as official organizations, their behaviors are assumed (and often do) reflect the regime's desires (Weber, 2016; Davenport, 1995).

When citizens challenge the political status quo, the government may respond with repression (DeMeritt, 2016; Carey, 2006); if it does, it makes a choice between employing official security agents or auxiliary groups. Our central question is therefore When would governments prefer using official security forces (police, gendarmeries) for repression, and when would they prefer to rely on auxiliary groups? Moreover, we ask if this choice is strategic, namely: do governments use the agents at their disposal indiscriminately, so they serve as simple substitutes for each other, or whether they make a choice based on the type of agent, meaning the two types are complements?

## Sensitivity Analyses

Table A3 illustrates our findings' robustness to using deeper lags of the dependent variable by adding two-to-five month lags to our full models. The size, sign, and statistical significance of *Violent Riots<sub>t</sub>* and *Nonviolent Dissent<sub>t</sub>* holds in each case, suggesting our results are not driven by serial autocorrelation. Next, Table A4 replaces *Formal Repression<sub>t</sub>* with a variable where only attacks recorded as being perpetrated by the military were included to illustrate our theory is robust to our decision not to include the military in our discussion of repression. The findings lend support to this decision. The coefficient of neither *Violent Riots<sub>t</sub>* nor *Nonviolent Dissent<sub>t</sub>* is significant according to any standard statistical threshold, suggesting that although the military may be deployed for repression in these cases (both coefficients are positive, although they are practically zero), it is not clear this is done systematically, at least within our sample. Next, there is the possibility that the reliance on auxiliaries simply reflects low state capacity, as governments that do not have effective formal forces to rely on, deploy auxiliaries. To this end, Table A5 adds (log) annual nighttime light emissions for each country to illustrate our results are robust to this concern.

Next, Table A6 first reports two negative binomial models corresponding to each dependent variable in the full pVAR model reported in Table 2 of the main paper to illustrate that our findings are not driven by the fact that our dependent variables are count-based. We rely on the negative binomial distribution (NB), which accommodates the over-dispersion that likely exists in such political violence data by relaxing the assumption that the mean and variance are equal in the data, and are hence more robust than other count models such as the standard Poisson. Importantly, while these models do not account for endogeneity, the results hold in terms of sign – which endogeneity alone is unlikely to completely explain – and become even more statistically significant. The next two columns in Table A6 then report similar models, this time covering the entire period for which data is available (Jan, 1997 – December 2011), which we were unable to do in our pVAR models, as we discussed in the text. Importantly, our results still hold even on this much extended sample, suggesting



they are not the result of the specific time window we chose for our pVAR models. The one potential exception is that we now see a positive and statistically significant coefficient of *Nonviolent Dissent<sub>t</sub>* on *Formal Repression<sub>t</sub>*, although we do not see *Violent Riots<sub>t</sub>* having a similar effect on *Formal Repression<sub>t</sub>*. This may suggest that agency loss is a greater concern compared with enjoying the benefits of plausible deniability for regimes making a strategic choice between formal and auxiliary agents. Nevertheless, overall, Tables A3–A6 generally confirm our findings, thus providing additional evidence as to the plausibility of our theoretical argument.

Table A3: Determinants of Repression, January 2007–December 2011 – Added Lags

	2 Lags		3 Lags		4 Lags		5 Lags	
	Formal	Auxiliary	Formal	Auxiliary	Formal	Auxiliary	Formal	Auxiliary
<i>Violent Riots</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.353* (0.195)	0.092 (0.117)	0.358* (0.194)	0.100 (0.116)	0.357* (0.196)	0.096 (0.119)	0.359* (0.197)	0.087 (0.118)
<i>Nonviolent Dissent</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.033 (0.033)	0.069** (0.030)	0.032 (0.033)	0.068** (0.030)	0.034 (0.033)	0.069** (0.029)	0.033 (0.033)	0.069** (0.031)
<i>Formal Repression</i> <sub>t-1</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.111** (0.047)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.101** (0.044)	-0.014 (0.032)	0.093** (0.045)	-0.018 (0.035)	0.086* (0.047)	-0.018 (0.033)
<i>Auxiliary Repression</i> <sub>t-1</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.045 (0.029)	0.251*** (0.048)	0.043 (0.031)	0.251*** (0.046)	0.047 (0.031)	0.250*** (0.048)	0.047 (0.031)	0.248*** (0.042)
<i>Formal Repression</i> <sub>t-2</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.017 (0.046)	0.016 (0.036)	0.019 (0.049)	0.013 (0.036)	0.011 (0.046)	0.012 (0.034)	0.010 (0.043)	0.012 (0.037)
<i>Auxiliary Repression</i> <sub>t-2</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.028 (0.018)	0.098 (0.061)	0.025 (0.019)	0.081 (0.056)	0.024 (0.020)	0.091 (0.056)	0.024 (0.020)	0.100 (0.054)
<i>Formal Repression</i> <sub>t-3</sub> <sup>1</sup>	–	–	-0.010 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.031)	-0.019 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.029)	-0.030 (0.027)	-0.022 (0.027)
<i>Auxiliary Repression</i> <sub>t-3</sub> <sup>1</sup>	–	–	0.026 (0.035)	0.052 (0.027)	0.033 (0.038)	0.048 (0.025)	0.033 (0.037)	0.047** (0.023)
<i>Formal Repression</i> <sub>t-4</sub> <sup>1</sup>	–	–	–	–	0.025 (0.034)	-0.029 (0.034)	0.028 (0.034)	-0.016 (0.033)
<i>Auxiliary Repression</i> <sub>t-4</sub> <sup>1</sup>	–	–	–	–	-0.018 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.033)	-0.015 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.031)
<i>Formal Repression</i> <sub>t-5</sub> <sup>1</sup>	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.009 (0.021)	-0.093** (0.037)
<i>Auxiliary Repression</i> <sub>t-5</sub> <sup>1</sup>	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.007 (0.028)	0.009 (0.030)
<i>Civil War Onset</i> <sub>t</sub>	0.147 (0.092)	0.120** (0.061)	0.149 (0.094)	0.105* (0.057)	0.150 (0.092)	0.106* (0.058)	0.153* (0.092)	0.109* (0.059)
<i>Coup D'état</i> <sub>t</sub>	-0.135** (0.067)	-0.126 (0.087)	-0.133** (0.067)	-0.123 (0.085)	-0.136** (0.067)	-0.124 (0.087)	-0.136** (0.067)	-0.121 (0.086)
<i>Population</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	-1.289 (0.993)	-1.515 (1.613)	-1.242 (0.946)	-1.567 (1.640)	-1.243 (0.925)	-1.375 (1.548)	-1.246 (0.935)	-1.203 (1.497)
<i>Oil Price</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.195** (0.088)	0.237 (0.181)	0.191** (0.088)	0.228 (0.176)	0.199** (0.088)	0.229 (0.174)	0.198** (0.089)	0.222 (0.172)
<i>Democracy</i> <sub>t</sub>	-0.700*** (0.202)	-0.077 (0.165)	-0.691*** (0.204)	-0.074 (0.151)	-0.685*** (0.205)	-0.067 (0.157)	-0.694*** (0.212)	-0.069 (0.137)
<i>Natural disasters</i> <sub>t</sub>	-0.033** (0.016)	0.001 (0.022)	-0.033** (0.016)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.031** (0.016)	0.004 (0.023)	-0.028 (0.016)	-0.0001 (0.024)
Observations	3,048		3,048		3,048		3,048	
N. groups/states	51		51		51		51	
Hansen $\chi^2$	367.33		363.16		356.10		348.85	

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Variable coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>1</sup> Natural log

Table A4: Determinants of Repression, January 2007–December 2011 – Military Repression

	<b>Military</b>	<b>Auxiliary</b>
<i>Violent Riots</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.058 (0.042)	0.092 (0.114)
<i>Nonviolent Dissent</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.004 (0.007)	0.067** (0.0314)
<i>Military Repression</i> <sub>t-1</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.113*** (0.017)	-0.010 (0.054)
<i>Auxiliary Repression</i> <sub>t-1</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.012 (0.012)	0.282 *** (0.055)
<i>Civil War Onset</i> <sub>t</sub>	0.098 (0.083)	0.139** (0.067)
<i>Coup D'état</i> <sub>t</sub>	-0.044* (0.026)	-0.134 (0.097)
<i>Population</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.881 (0.719)	-0.790 (1.878)
<i>Oil Price</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.019 (0.054)	0.237 (0.205)
<i>Democracy</i> <sub>t</sub>	0.017 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.111)
<i>Natural disasters</i> <sub>t</sub>	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.026)
Observations	3,048	
N. groups/states	51	
Hansen $\chi^2$	274.88	

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Variable coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered in parentheses. Fixed effects by year and month were included in each regression although not reported here.

<sup>1</sup> Natural log

Table A5: Determinants of Repression, January 2007–December 2011 – State Capacity

	<b>Formal</b>	<b>Auxiliary</b>
<i>Violent Riots</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.344* (0.196)	0.082 (0.119)
<i>Nonviolent Dissent</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.323 (0.324)	0.071** (0.032)
<i>Formal Repression</i> <sub>t-1</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.123** (0.050)	-0.009 (0.033)
<i>Auxiliary Repression</i> <sub>t-1</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.047 (0.030)	0.268*** (0.062)
<i>Civil War Onset</i> <sub>t</sub>	0.141 (0.090)	0.105* (0.059)
<i>Coup D'état</i> <sub>t</sub>	-0.130* (0.075)	-0.123 (0.104)
<i>Population</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	-1.104 (0.869)	-1.059 (1.470)
<i>Oil Price</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	0.226** (0.098)	0.301 (0.224)
<i>Democracy</i> <sub>t</sub>	-0.729*** (0.219)	-0.113 (0.173)
<i>Natural disasters</i> <sub>t</sub>	-0.030 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.022)
<i>Nighttime Light</i> <sub>t</sub> <sup>1</sup>	-10.121 (0.107)	-0.168 (0.148)
Observations	3,048	
N. groups/states	51	
Hansen $\chi^2$	372.24	

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Variable coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered in parentheses. Fixed effects by year and month were included in each regression although not reported here.

<sup>1</sup> Natural log

Table A6: Determinants of Repression, Negative Binomial Models

	2007–2011		1997–2011	
	Formal	Auxiliary	Formal	Auxiliary
<i>Violent Riots<sub>t</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	0.913** (0.371)	0.324 (0.408)	0.944*** (0.247)	0.017 (0.270)
<i>Nonviolent Dissent<sub>t</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	0.132 (0.113)	0.317*** (0.112)	0.220*** (0.074)	0.436*** (0.071)
<i>Formal Repression<sub>t-1</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	0.479*** (0.031)	0.244*** (0.033)	0.533*** (0.024)	0.183*** (0.026)
<i>Auxiliary Repression<sub>t-1</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	0.062*** (0.008)	0.352*** (0.008)	0.083*** (0.006)	0.404*** (0.006)
<i>Civil War Onset<sub>t</sub></i>	-0.587 (0.440)	0.485 (0.358)	-0.378 (0.328)	0.145 (0.290)
<i>Coup D'état<sub>t</sub></i>	-0.927** (0.457)	-1.671*** (0.516)	0.962*** (0.195)	0.051 (0.205)
<i>Population<sub>t</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	0.446*** (0.055)	0.711*** (0.058)	0.642*** (0.040)	0.650*** (0.037)
<i>Oil Price<sub>t</sub></i> <sup>1</sup>	1.240** (0.537)	-0.157 (0.593)	1.136*** (0.193)	-0.197 (0.161)
<i>Democracy<sub>t</sub></i>	-0.429** (0.168)	-0.494*** (0.164)	-0.559*** (0.131)	-0.636*** (0.120)
<i>Natural disasters<sub>t</sub></i>	-0.040 (0.155)	0.108 (0.145)	-0.113 (0.104)	0.191** (0.093)
	-13.043*** (2.473)	-8.083*** (2.674)	-12.933*** (0.954)	-6.044*** (0.760)
Observations	3,048	3,048	9,117	9,117
Log Likelihood	-1,321.606	-1,724.037	-3,251.767	-4,744.178
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,695.213	3,500.073	6,575.535	9,560.355

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. Variable coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered in parentheses. Fixed effects by year and month were included in each regression although not reported here.

<sup>1</sup> Natural log

# Coding Riots and Nonviolent Dissent in Pakistan

## 1. Brief Description of Sample and Variables

- Sample: includes the 7 largest cities in Sind and Punjab provinces of Pakistan from 2006 to 2015. These cities includes Faisalabad, Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Multan, Peshawar, Rawalpindi.
- Violent Riots: Episodes of violent riots by citizens in each city-year targeted specifically toward government institutions, government-owned infrastructure, government-owned property, and state officials.
- Protest: Episodes of peaceful anti-government demonstrations (including strikes, boycotts, political protests) by citizens in each city-year in the sample.
- Police and Ranger riot attacks: Number of times police (Sind and Punjab police and Frontier Corps) and Rangers violently responded to violent rioters in each city-year.
- Police and Ranger protest attacks: Number of times police (Sind and Punjab police) and Rangers violently responded to non-violent, peaceful demonstrators in each city-year.
- Militia riot attack: Frequency of PGM violent repressive response to violent rioters in each city-year.
- Militia protest attack: Frequency of PGM violent response to non-violent anti-government demonstrators in each city-year.

## 2. Information for (i) Violent Riot Episodes, (ii) Peaceful demonstration episodes, (iii) Police attacks on rioters and peaceful demonstrators, and (iv) Ranger attacks on rioters and peaceful demonstrators Taken from:

- Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Security Report, years 2012–2015 (Islamabad: PIPS, 2013–2016), <http://pakpips.com/securityreport>

- Sindh Bureau of Statistics, Development Statistics of Sindh 2013 (Karachi: Government of Sindh, 2014); “Monthly Heinous Crime Reports,” Sindh Police website, accessed December 17, 2018. Data for 2006–12 is taken from the Bureau of Statistics’ report, while data for 2013–15 is from the Sindh Police website. The 2015 data covers only January and October.
- Statistical Pocket Book, Bureau of Statistics, Government of the Punjab, Lahore 2011-2015 (Lahore: Government of Punjab), <http://www.bos.gop.pk/PocketBook>
- Data for 2006–10 is taken from the Bureau of Statistics’ Punjab Development Statistics, Government of the Punjab, Lahore 2006-2010 (Lahore: Government of Punjab), <http://www.bos.gop.pk/developmentstat>
- Supplemented with information from Punjab police statistics, <https://punjabpolice.gov.pk/statistics>
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